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Despite the impressive amount of financial resources invested 
in carrying out large-scale brain simulations, it is 
controversial what the payoffs are of pursuing this project. 
The present paper argues that in some cases, from designing, 
building, and running a large-scale neural simulation, 
scientists acquire useful knowledge about the computational 
performance of the simulating system, rather than about the 
neurobiological system represented in the simulation. What 
this means, why it is not a trivial lesson, and how it advances 
the literature on the epistemology of computer simulation are 
the three preoccupations addressed by the paper. 
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Introduction 
In the last twenty years or so, several research groups have 
been working on large-scale brain simulations. In the face of 
the impressive amount of financial resources invested in 
such projects, it is controversial what the payoffs are of 
carrying out large-scale brain simulations. The present paper 
explores this issue, asking: Currently, what do scientists 
learn from designing, building, and running large-scale 
neural simulations? One plausible answer is that at least for 
some such simulations scientists learn about the 
computational performance of the simulating system. 
Plausible as it sounds, the significance of this answer 
should not be downplayed, for at least two reasons. First, 
most work in the epistemology of computer simulation 
overlooks or downplays the computational and material 
aspects of computer simulation. But learning about the 
computational performance of a machine is far from trivial. 
Second, the kinds of neural simulations examined in this 
paper involve an interesting set of practices that have not 
been adequately discussed in the epistemology of modelling 
and computer simulation. 
In particular, these simulations have two kinds of targets: 
one target is a real neural system, which is represented in 
the simulation; the other target is the computing system 
itself, which is not represented in the simulation but studied 
both directly and through complicated inferences. If this is 
correct, then two interesting conclusions follow. (1) When 
scientific models and computer simulation are employed to 
gain new knowledge, it is not always knowledge about their 
represented target systems that is sought. For some neural 
simulations, the real neural system that one tries to represent 
is not the system about which one wants to learn. (2) Some 
neural simulations imitate some features of a real neural 
system (i.e., their representational target) not in order to 
serve as surrogates that are investigated to gain new 
knowledge about the brain. Rather, these neural simulations 
imitate some features of a real neural system in order to gain 
useful knowledge about the simulating system itself. 
While claim (1) concerns the type of knowledge one may 
want or hope to acquire with computer simulation, claim (2) 
concerns one possible representational function of computer 
simulation. 
 
Large-scale Neural Simulations: Aims and 
Prospects 
For many large-scale neural simulations, a simulating 
system implements some algorithm that finds solutions to 
mathematical equations that are believed to describe the 
dynamics and pattern of connectivity of a large number 
(e.g., over a million) of neurons and synapses (for reviews 
Brette et al. 2007; de Garis et al. 2010; Goertzel et al. 2010; 
Eliasmith & Trujillo 2014). 
A large-scale neural simulation is a type of computer 
simulation. Computer simulation can be characterised 
broadly as “a comprehensive method for studying systems,” 
which “includes choosing a model; finding a way of 
implementing that model in a form that can be run on a 
computer; calculating the output of the algorithm; and 
visualizing and studying the resultant data” (Winsberg 
2013). Accordingly, some real-world system should be 
picked as the representational target of the computer 
simulation; some mathematical equations should be chosen, 
which are believed to model (some aspect of) the behavior 
of the target system; and an appropriate simulating system, 
consisting of both hardware and software components, 
should be used to implement the mathematical model. 
In line with much of the philosophical literature, where 
models and simulations are understood as serving as 
representations of some system about which one wants or 
hopes to gain knowledge (e.g., Humphreys 2004; Parker 
2009; Grüne-Yanoff & Weirich 2010; Weisberg 2013), 
Winsberg (2013) claims that the entire process constituting 
computer simulation is “used to make inferences about the 
target system that one tries to model.” 
The claim also coheres with the stated aims of many 
large-scale neural simulations. For example, the Blue Brain 
Project set out to “simulate brains of mammals with a high 
level of biological accuracy and, ultimately, to study the 
steps involved in the emergence of biological intelligence” 
(Markram 2006, 153). The objective of carrying out certain 
large-scale neural simulations is to understand why and how 
many different ion channels, receptors, neurons, and 
synaptic pathways in the brain contribute to different brain 
functions and to emergent, intelligent behavior (158). The 
aim of Izhikevich & Edelman’s (2008) simulation of a 
million spiking thalamo-cortical neurons and half a billion 
synapses was analogous. They explained that “[o]ne way to 
deepen our understanding of how synaptic and neuronal 
processes interact to produce the collective behavior of the 
brain is to develop large-scale, anatomically detailed models 
of the mammalian brain” (3597). Similarly, the objective of 
Eliasmith and colleagues’ (2012) 2.5 million neuron 
simulation was to understand why and how the robust and 
rapid flexibility of biological systems can be generated from 
a unified set of neural mechanisms. 
Despite significant differences, the aim shared by these 
projects is to use large-scale neural simulations to 
understanding of how and why brains’ multi-scale, complex 
organization generates different brain functions and 
emergent cognitive phenomena. This aim may be reached. 
Yet, it is far from uncontroversial that, currently, a large-
scale neural simulation is a fruitful approach to addressing 
questions about why and how neurons and synapses’ 
dynamics generate different brain functions and cognitive 
phenomena (Mainen & Pouget 2014). 
Commenting on this approach, Carandini (2012) argues 
that, currently, “putting all of the subcellular details (most of 
which we don’t even know) into a simulation of a vast 
circuit is not likely to shed light on the underlying 
computations” (509). If the underlying neural computations 
are not understood, there is little hope to learn how and why 
neural circuits generate different brain functions and 
cognitive phenomena. In a similar vein, Sporns (2012) 
points out that the success of projects like Markram’s Blue 
Brain “depends on knowledge about the organization of 
neurons and molecules into complex networks whose 
function underpins system dynamics” (168). Such 
knowledge is currently sparse and not easily incorporable 
into large-scale neural simulations. So, it is doubtful that, 
currently, carrying out large-scale neural simulations is a 
fruitful approach to learn about the neurobiological systems 
represented in the simulation. 
 
Brains and Computational Performance 
More plausible is that, currently, from at least some large-
scale neural simulations, scientists gain knowledge about 
the computational performance of the simulating system 
itself, rather than about the neural system that the simulation 
represents. 
Simulating systems are computing systems comprising 
both software and hardware components. They include a 
computational architecture and a set of algorithms 
formulated as computer programs that can be executed on 
concrete computing machines. The computational 
performance of the simulating system depends on a complex 
combination of properties of its architecture, of the 
algorithms it uses, the programs it executes, and of the 
materials and technological devices of which it is made. 
Three dimensions on which computational performance 
can be assessed are: the time it takes for the computing 
system to carry out a given task, the maximum number of 
tasks that can be completed by the system in a given time 
interval, and the electrical power it takes for the system to 
carry out a task. 
The total time required for a computing system to 
complete a task is called execution time. One way to 
measure the execution time of a program is in terms of clock 
period, which is the time length (in nanoseconds) of a cycle 
of the clock built into the system that determines when 
events take place in the hardware. The clock rate (in hertz) 
is the inverse of the clock period. Increasing computational 
performance for a given program requires decreasing its 
execution time, which may be tackled as an engineering 
problem—viz. as the problem of reducing the clock 
period—or as a computational problem—viz. as the 
problem of designing a more efficient computational 
architecture or more efficient algorithms and programs. 
The number of tasks that can be completed per unit time 
by a computing system is called throughput. If we focus on 
the communication channels of a computing system, then 
the maximum throughput of a channel is often called 
bandwidth (measured in bits of data/second). The amount of 
time it takes for a communication channel to become 
unoccupied so that it can allow for data transfer is called 
latency. The available bandwidth of a communication 
channel is a limited resource, and should be used sparingly. 
The greater the bandwidth capacity, or the lower the latency 
of the communication channels, the more likely it is that the 
system displays better computational performance. The 
throughput, bandwidth, and latency of a computing system 
are a complex function of the physical medium being used 
for communications, the system’s wiring architecture and 
the type of code used for programming. 
The microprocessors of computing systems dissipate 
heat. Heat must be removed from a computing system; else, 
its hardware components will overheat. Conserving power 
and avoiding overheating, while improving computational 
performance, have led computer scientists and engineers to 
explore novel architectures, hardware technologies, software 
solutions and programming languages for highly-efficient 
computing systems. 
There are two reasons why carrying out a computer 
simulation of a large number of neurons and synapses can 
yield non-trivial knowledge of the computational 
performance of the simulating system. First reason: brains 
can be understood as computational systems, which can be 
used to set a real biological benchmark for artificial 
computing systems’ performance. Second reason: 
scalability, which indicates how efficient an application is 
when using increasing numbers of parallel processing units 
or amount of computational resources. 
If the brain is a computing system, then it displays high 
performance in the face of low power consumption and 
small size. On average, the human brain weighs around 
1.3 to 1.5 Kg, is constituted by about 100 billion neurons 
and around 100 trillion synapses, and its volume is about 
1,400 ml. For carrying out its computations, it consumes 
energy at a rate of about 20 watts. Brains’ computational 
architecture and style of computing are very different from 
those of modern artificial computing systems. Modern 
artificial computing systems possess von Neumann 
architecture and have stored programs, which are typically 
implemented in digital, serial, synchronous, centralized and 
fast microcircuits. By contrast, biological brains possess a 
non-von Neumann, multiscale, network architecture; they 
have distributed computational units, which carry out 
mixed-mode analog-digital, parallel, asynchronous, slow, 
noisy, computations (Montague 2007; Piccinini & Bahar 
2013). 
Available information about general computational 
features of biological brains can provide one basis for 
benchmarking the performance of artificial computational 
systems along some dimension of interest like power 
consumption or scalability. Comparing the computational 
performance of the simulating system in a large-scale neural 
simulation to that of its neurobiological target along some 
dimension of interest allows scientists to learn about why 
and how certain features of the simulating system (e.g., its 
network architecture, its materials) impact its performance 
relative to that dimension. 
What about scalability? Although it is problematic to 
precisely define ‘scalability,’ the term is generally used in 
computer science to denote the capacity of a multiprocessor 
parallel computing system to accommodate a growing 
number of processing units or to carry out a growing 
volume of work gracefully (Hill 1990). Scalability is a 
desirable feature of a computing system because it allows 
for hardware or software components to be added in the 
system without outgrowing it. Two more specific notions, 
helpful to assess the performance of a large-scale 
simulation, are those of strong scaling and weak scaling, 
which denote respectively the capacity of a system to reduce 
execution time for solving a fixed-size problem by adding 
processors, and the capacity to keep execution time constant 
by adding processors so as to accommodate additional 
workload. Assessing strong scaling is particularly relevant 
to learning about why some program takes a long time to 
run (something that is CPU-bound). Assessing weak scaling 
is particularly relevant to learning why some program takes 
a lot of memory to run (something that is memory-bound). 
Lack of scalability in large-scale neural simulation can 
indicate that the architecture of the simulating system 
cannot effectively solve problems of a certain size that 
biological brains can solve quickly. It can indicate that 
adding more simulated neurons and synapses to the 
simulating system is not an efficient strategy to execute a 
certain program more quickly, as the communication costs 
would increase as a function of the number of processors 
added to the system. It can also indicate that the power 
consumption required by a system that grows larger is too 
costly. So, by taxing an artificial computing system by 
simulating millions of neurons and synapses, scientists can 
learn about trade-offs between memory, computation, and 
communication in a certain computational architecture. 
 
Brains, simulations, and neuromorphic devices 
Learning about the computational performance of a 
computing system can be important for developing 
neuromorphic technologies. Neuromorphic technologies are 
devices for information processing and data analysis that 
aim to approximate the computational architecture and style 
of computing of biological brains. Such technologies 
include vision systems, auditory processors, multi-sensor 
integrators, autonomous robots, and tools for handling and 
analysing large amount of data (Indiveri & Horiuchi 2011). 
SyNAPSE (Systems of Neuromorphic Adaptive Plastic 
Scalable Electronics) is an on-going research program 
funded by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA). “The vision for the SyNAPSE program 
is to develop electronic neuromorphic machine technology 
that scales to biological levels” (DARPA BAA08-28). This 
research program aims to develop electronic technology 
with similar computational performance to the mammalian 
brain in terms of size, speed, and energy consumption. 
Under the SyNAPSE program, Preissl and colleagues 
(2012) carried out a computer simulation of a very large 
neural circuit with the ultimate goal of exploring how 
closely one can “approximate the function, power, volume 
and real-time performance of the brain within the limits of 
modern technology” (10). The representational target 
system of their simulation was a network comprising 65 
billion neurons and 16 trillion synapses, which imitated the 
largest known wiring diagram in the macaque monkey’s 
brain. This biological target was modelled as a network of 
neurosynaptic cores containing digital integrate-leak-and-
fire neurons. 
The simulating system involved a 16-rack Blue Gene/Q 
supercomputer of 16,384 to 262,144 CPUs and 256 TB of 
main memory, and Compass, a multi-threaded, massively-
parallel software, which enabled the simulation of billions 
of neurosynaptic cores operating in a parallel, distributed, 
and semi-synchronous fashion. 
The modelling choices of Preissl and colleagues were 
congenial to the pursuit of an engineering goal. The 
neurons, synapses, and axons in their simulation were 
modelled as event-driven (asynchronous), digital, integrate-
leak-and-fire circuits. The leaky integrate-and-fire model is 
one of the simplest models of spiking neurons. Given its 
lack of biophysical detail, the range of phenomena that this 
model can address is limited. Nonetheless, the model is 
analytically solvable and relatively easy to implement in a 
computer simulation. For many integrate-and-fire neurons 
models, the model fits nicely with an event-driven 
simulation, whereby all operations in the simulation are 
driven by neural spike events, which is generally well suited 
to decrease computational time and minimize memory load. 
The inter-core pattern of connections embodied in Compass 
imitated the macaque’s neural wiring. The relationship 
between the model-network and its neurobiological target 
was not isomorphic; it was a similarity relation, which is 
generally sufficient to allow scientists to learn from 
computer simulation, especially when, like in this case, 
some relevant aspects and degrees of similarity are specified 
based on the question at hand, available background 
knowledge and the larger scientific context (Teller, 2001; 
Giere, 2004; Weisberg, 2013). 
Implementing the macaque’s wiring diagram 
“challenges the communication and computational 
capabilities of Compass in a manner consistent with 
supporting brain-like networks” (11). The performance of 
the simulating system could then be compared with that of 
the real neurobiological system represented in the computer 
simulation. A quantitative characterization of the deviations 
between the real neural system and the simulating system 
allowed scientists to identify which features of architectural 
and communication-design contributed to computational 
efficiency. 
Preissl and colleagues’ computer simulation could be 
used as a test-bed for learning about the performance of 
hardware and software components of a simulating system 
put under serious computational stress. Simulating a neural 
network at that scale poses major challenges for 
computation, memory, and communication, even with 
current supercomputers. If we consider N neurons, whose 
average firing rate is H, and whose average number of 
synapses is S, and we take account of all spike 
transmissions, then a real-time simulation of 1 second of 
biological time should process N x H x S spike 
transmissions. This minimal number of operations set a 
benchmark to assess the computational performance of a 
neural simulation (Brette et al. 2007, 350-1). 
Preissl et al.’s (2012) simulation yielded two main 
results. First, as the average spiking rate of neurons was 8.1 
Hz, the simulation was 388x slower than real time. Second, 
simulating the pattern of structural connectivity of the 
macaque’s brain, the simulating system displayed near-
perfect weak and strong scaling. While acquiring this type 
of information does not obviously yield novel insight about 
phenomena produced by biological brains, it is relevant to 
the development of more efficient artificial computing 
systems. As Preissl and colleagues put it: “Compass is a 
harbinger of an emerging use of today’s modern 
supercomputers for midwifing the next generation of 
application-specific processors that are increasingly 
proliferating to satisfy a world that is hungering for 
increased performance and lower power while facing the 
projected end of CMOS scaling and increasing obstacles in 
pushing clock rates ever higher” (11). 
 
Representing and Learning with Large-scale 
Neural Simulations 
Two claims are widely shared in the literature about the 
epistemology of computer simulation and scientific 
modelling (Frigg & Hartmann 2012). First, in target-
directed modelling, when scientific models and computer 
simulations are used to acquire new knowledge, it is 
knowledge about their represented targets that is ultimately 
sought (Weisberg 2013, Ch. 5). Second, computer 
simulations imitate some features of their represented target 
just to serve as surrogates that are investigated to gain new 
knowledge about it (Swoyer 1991). That is, the 
representational relation that holds between computer 
simulations and their represented targets allow scientists to 
perform inferences just from the simulation to its 
represented target. 
These two claims should be rectified in the light of 
computer simulations like Preissl and colleagues’. For some 
large-scale neural simulations, computer simulations have 
two kinds of targets about which one may want to gain new 
knowledge. One kind of target is a real neural system, which 
is represented in the simulation; the other kind of target is 
the computing system itself, which is not represented in the 
simulation, but studied either directly, or through 
complicated inferences. Depending on the goal of the 
scientists designing and running the computer simulation, 
these inferences may or may not be based on the assumption 
that the simulating system bears some representational 
relation with its neural target. 
Generally, computer simulations can instruct scientists 
about some aspect of reality even if it is not assumed that 
the mathematical model implemented in the simulation has 
counterparts in the world about which scientists want or 
hope to learn. In these cases, the aspects of reality about 
which scientists hope to gain novel information are some of 
the computational features of the simulating system, rather 
than some of the features of the real system represented in 
the computer simulation. Assuming that the simulating 
system bears some representational relation with a 
neurobiological target is not necessary to gain this 
information. In fact, benchmarking software exists that can 
be used to assess the relative performance of artificial 
computing systems’ hardware or programs. 
However, assuming that a simulating system does bear 
some representational relation with its neural target allows 
scientists to study performance discrepancies between the 
simulating system and the neurobiological system, which 
can function as useful benchmark along some dimension of 
interest. By characterising such discrepancies, constraints on 
computational efficiency can then be identified, which is 
particularly useful when the goal is to acquire knowledge 
useful for designing neuromorphic innovations. 
The claim that computer simulation can instruct scientists 
about kinds of target systems that are different from those 
represented in the simulation resonates with Humphreys’ 
(2009), Parker’s (2009), and Winsberg’s (2010) emphasis 
on the specifically computational and material features of 
computer simulations. Commenting on the philosophical 
novelty of computational science, writes Humphreys: a 
“novel feature of computational science is that it forces us to 
make a distinction between what is applicable in practice 
and what is applicable only in principle… Ignoring 
implementation constraints can lead to inadvisable remarks 
[e.g. about the epistemology of computer simulations]” 
(2009, 623). 
Learning about a simulating system’s computational 
performance is one way to learn about “what is applicable in 
practice and what is applicable only in principle” with 
respect to the engineering of novel computing technologies. 
If some computer simulations are intended to yield new 
knowledge only about the computing system used in the 
simulation, then scientific models and simulations need not 
be vehicles to learn about their represented targets. 
Sometimes, scientists do not translate the results of a 
computer simulation into knowledge about the represented 
target. Since these simulating systems are computing 
systems, they instantiate a set of computational, measurable 
properties. Running a large-scale neural simulation can 
yield measurements of these properties, which provide 
information about the computational performance of the 
system, given some benchmark. Knowing about the 
computational performance of the system along some 
dimension of interest can ground the practical design of 
neuromorphic computing devices. 
Examining the relationship between computer simulations 
and traditional experiments, Parker (2009) stresses “the 
importance of… understanding computer experiments as, 
first and foremost, experiments on real material systems. 
The experimental system in a computer experiment is the 
programmed digital computer—a physical system made of 
wire, plastic, etc… In a computer simulation study, 
scientists learn first and foremost about the behavior of the 
programmed computer” (488-9). 
Learning about the behavior of a programmed computer is 
far from being trivial or unimportant, as Preissl and 
colleagues’ (2012) work illustrates. Compass incorporated 
“several innovations in communication, computation, and 
memory” based on available knowledge of some aspects of 
the function, power and volume of organic brains (10). 
Compass was found to have near-perfect weak and strong 
scaling when a model was run of the neural dynamics of a 
large circuit of the macaque’s brain. By themselves, these 
types of results do not yield novel information about some 
set of computational properties instantiated by biological 
brains; and, given the aims of Preissl et al.’ simulation, they 
were not translated into knowledge about the represented 
target system. Instead, the specific importance of these 
results lies in their offering the basis for developing a novel, 
efficient, computational architecture that can support a host 
of neuromorphic applications (Modha et al. 2011). 
Having stressed the importance of recognizing that “in a 
computer simulation study scientists learn first and foremost 
about the behavior of the programmed computer,” Parker 
(2009) claims that: “from that behavior, taking various 
features of it to represent features of some target system, 
they hope to infer something of interest about the target 
system” (489). This widely-held claim should be qualified 
in two ways, however. 
First, Preissl and colleagues’ (2012) study shows that, 
from the behavior of a computing system that simulates the 
dynamics of a large-scale neural network, scientists need not 
draw any inference about the neural system represented in 
the simulation. Second, assuming that the simulating system 
does bear some representational relation with a set of 
computational properties instantiated by some biological 
neural network allows scientists to characterise the 
performance discrepancies between neurobiological 
network and artificial simulating system. The 
characterisation of this discrepancy can be valuable for 
some scientific or engineering aim. 
The brain is a kind of computing machine. If the brain is a 
computing machine, then there is a set of properties 
possessed by both biological brains and artificial computing 
systems such that specific instantiations of these properties 
determine the computational performance that the 
computing machine—biological or otherwise—can reach. 
From available information, biological brains instantiate 
determinate properties such that the computational 
performance they can reach is significantly higher than the 
performance of the best current artificial super-computers. If 
these properties are known, and if some information is 
available about how they determine the performance of 
biological brains, then scientists may justifiably assume that 
in some large-scale neural simulation the simulating system 
imitates some features of the brain relevant to instantiate 
those computational properties. 
Unlike scale models such the scale model of a bridge or 
of a car, which are typically down-sized or enlarged copies 
of their target systems, Preissl et al.’s (2012) large-scale 
neural simulation imitated some features of the brain not in 
order to serve as a surrogate that is investigated to draw 
conclusions on the represented neurobiological target. 
Rather, the assumed representational relation between the 
simulation and the biological brain justified scientists to 
draw inferences about how closely the function, power, 
volume and real-time performance of the brain can be 
approximated within the limits of current technology. The 
neural scale and pattern of connectivity embodied in 
Compass challenged its communication, memory and 
computational capabilities. In the face of these challenges, 
the simulating system performance could be compared to 
that of a biological brain along some dimensions of interest 
like neural spiking rates, latency and bandwidth. For 
example, running on the IBM Blue Gene/Q supercomputer, 
Compass was found to be 388x slower than real-time 
performance of the brain, which is useful to characterise its 
computational performance. 
So, in some cases, large-scale neural simulations imitate 
the brain not in order to serve as a surrogate investigated in 
its stead. The brain is imitated because it offers a biological 
benchmark against which the simulating system’s design 
and performance can be assessed. Information about how 
certain properties determine the computational performance 
of biological brains can then be used not only to try and 
instantiate those properties in the design of artificial 
systems, but also to characterise the discrepancy between 
the brain’s and the simulating system’s performance. This 
characterisation might provide insight into what types of 
constraints and what determinate properties an artificial 
computing system need to instantiate for carrying out some 
task of interest more efficiently. 
Conclusions 
For some large-scale neural simulation, what is learned 
concerns the computational performance of the simulating 
system itself. Learning about the computational 
performance of a computing machine is far from trivial, and 
can afford knowledge useful for several engineering 
purposes. Once this role is recognized of some large-scale 
neural simulations, some widely held beliefs about the 
epistemology of computer simulations and modelling are in 
need of qualification. First, computer simulation can involve 
more than one kind of target system, about which one wants 
or hopes to acquire new knowledge. Second, when scientific 
models and computer simulations are employed to gain new 
knowledge, it is not always knowledge about their 
represented target systems that is sought. Third, assuming 
that some large-scale neural simulations imitate some 
features of their target neurobiological system allows 
scientists to characterize the performance discrepancies 
between biological brains and artificial computers, which 
may help identify constraints on computational efficiency 
for the design of neuromorphic technologies. 
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